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Abstract
I analyze Osaka factory worker households in the early 1920s, whether idiosyn-
cratic income shocks were shared efficiently, and which consumption categories were
robust to shocks. While the null hypothesis of full risk-sharing of total expenditures
was rejected, factory workers maintained their households, in that they paid for
essential expenditures (rent, utilities, and commutation) during economic hardship.
Additionally, children’s education expenditures were possibly robust to idiosyncratic
income shocks. The results suggest that temporary income is statistically signifi-
cantly increased if disposable income drops due to idiosyncratic shocks. Historical
documents suggest microfinancial lending and saving institutions helped mitigate
risk-based vulnerabilities.
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1 Introduction
Consumption smoothing is one of the most important means at the household level of
dealing with unforeseen shocks; this is especially the case in industrializing countries.
In developing economies, a collapse of smoothing impedes human capital accumulation
and the demographic structure itself (Foster 1995; Rose 1999; Gertler and Gruber 2002;
Dercon and Krishnan 2002). Therefore, households’ risk-coping mechanisms have been
widely studied, ever since a set of pioneering studies provided a systematic empirical
design by which to test consumption smoothing (Rosenzweig 1988; Mace 1991; Cochrane
1991; Townsend 1994).1
In terms of providing a historical context, despite there being a number of studies
on intrahousehold resource allocation, only a few studies have investigated consumption
smoothing among households in Western countries.2 For instance, Kiesling (1996) deter-
mined the importance of informal sources of income assistance (e.g., savings, transfers, and
charity) in Victorian Lancashire.3 Horrel and Oxley (2000) found evidence that British
industrial households made use of self-help organizations such as sickness and health bene-
fit clubs, which complemented family employment in addressing economic hardship in the
late 19th century. Scott and Walker (2012) also found that interwar British working-class
households extensively used risk-sharing institutions such as clubs and hire purchases to
smooth expenditures.4 Saaritsa (2008; 2011) found that informal assistance, credit, and
saving accounts had supported income smoothing among worker households in interwar
Helsinki. As for Asian countries, James and Suto (2011) found that in Japan in the 1910s
and 1920s, savings correlated positively with transitory income. According to their esti-
mates, the savings level was higher than that of working-class households in the United
States in the early 20th century. They suggest that the widespread use in prewar Japan
of postal saving accounts have encouraged or facilitated saving, relative to institutions
1 See Dercon (2004) for a review of earlier studies. See also Attanasio and Pistaferri (2016) and Meyer
and Sullivan (2017) for reviews and the latest discussions on consumption and income inequality.
2Examples of studies on intrahousehold resource allocation include Horrell and Oxley (1999; 2000;
2012) and Horrell et al. (2009). See Horrell and Oxley (2013) for a comprehensive review of these studies.
3See also Boyer (1997) for an alternative view of the importance of informal assistance.
4This finding is consistent with the reduction of absolute poverty among urban British working-class
households in the early 20th century (Gazeley and Newell 2012). See also O’Connell and Reid (2005) for
details of working-class consumer credit in the United Kingdom at that time.
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available to US workers.
These findings within the literature confirm that risk-sharing institutions and self-
insurance behavior played an important role for working-class households in mitigating
idiosyncratic shocks in periods of historical economic development. The current study
builds on this historical view within the literature. However, I seek to contribute by
addressing in the following ways the potential issues that have not yet been adequately
assessed.
First, the current study adopts a systematic empirical design to test risk-sharing.
Since the degree of consumption smoothing can reflect the levels of maturity of formal
and informal financial markets in a given economy, a systematic way of testing risk-
sharing would allow for comparable estimates for each objective economy, and thus offer
plentiful information by which to know and understand the diversity of historical economic
developments (Dercon 2004). In the field of economic history, however, there is a dearth
of research into the extent to which risk has been shared in specific countries and eras. In
the current study, therefore, I employ the stylized empirical strategy for testing a complete
market (Mace 1991; Cochrane 1991) and compare the elasticity (i.e., the responsiveness
of consumption changes to idiosyncratic income shocks) to that in Japan’s economy of
the 1990s, which was a near-complete market. Another advantage of this strategy is that
the degree of risk-sharing can be estimated for each expenditure item. In this way, the
current study examines each item’s sensitivities to idiosyncratic income shocks.
Second, the current study uses a unique household-level monthly expenditure panel
dataset captured through a survey of Osaka city completed around 1920. Since con-
sumption smoothing is a concept pertaining to the dynamics of household behavior over
time, monthly panel data on the household budget would be essentially needed to test a
household’s short-term smoothing behavior (e.g., Mace 1991). Unfortunately, however, it
is difficult to compile such household-level budget data in the historical context, due to
data unavailability (James and Suto 2011; Scott and Walker 2012). While Saaritsa (2011)
used a quarterly panel dataset of 142 households in 1928 Helsinki, but lower-frequency
aggregation over time could lead to difficulties in capturing the short-term responses of
the households. To overcome this issue, I use monthly variations in the household budget
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to investigate risk-coping behaviors among working-class households.
Third, the current study assesses the risk-coping strategy choices of the households.
There are usually several types of risk-coping instruments, such as microfinancial lend-
ing institutions and self-insurance. These are important means by which to deal with
the uncertainties inherent in developing economies (Carroll 1997; Fafchamps and Lund
2003). However, the systematic test of full risk-sharing, as discussed above, provides little
information as to how risks are shared. Therefore, the current study looks to investigate
whether temporary income from borrowings, as well as other sources (e.g., gifts and assets
use) serve in sharing risk efficiently. While economic history studies have analyzed what
types of informal insurances have correlated with income or consumption, the current
study is the first to test the short-term responses of household-level risk-coping behavior
while using a historical household-level monthly panel dataset.5
I found that while the null hypothesis of full risk-sharing for total expenditures was re-
jected, the responsiveness of the consumption changes to the idiosyncratic income shocks
was six times greater than that of Japan in the 1990s. Despite this sensitivity, factory
worker households could maintain themselves, in the sense that they could cope with
making payments for essential expenditures such as rent, utilities, and commutation.
Children’s education expenditures were also less likely to be affected by shocks. Tempo-
rary income was increased if disposable income was reduced by the idiosyncratic shocks.
Historical documents support the evidence that microfinancial lending institutions and
savings institutions had been used by households at that time as risk-coping strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the historical
background and explains the road map of the current study. Section 3 describes the
theoretical framework and empirical strategies used herein. Section 4 introduces the data
used, and Section 5 provides the results. Section 6 discusses the findings.
5Kiesling (1996) found a negative correlation between regional-level cotton consumption and the use
of public relief. Saaritsa (2011) found a negative correlation between quarterly household income and the
use of informal assistance. Scott and Walker (2012) found a positive cross-sectional correlation between
household income and both clothing club and hire purchase expenditures.
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2 Background
In early 20th-century Japan, the typical employment contract was fragile and stipulated
no fixed term of employment; thus, the labor mobility of factory workers—comprising not
only unskilled workers, but also skilled workers—was extremely high (Moriguchi 2000).
After World War I, large companies began to introduce comprehensive corporate welfare
programs for factory workers, in order to accumulate firm-specific human capital; addi-
tionally, the Retirement Allowance Fund Law of 1936, which obligated employers to set
up a retirement allowance fund for their employees, complemented these enterprise-based
welfare programs (Moriguchi 2003). As a result, the turnover rates of large companies
began to decline after the war, and fell to below 10% in the late 1920s (Hyodo 1971).
However, the factory workers employed by such large companies comprised only about
20% of all production workers in the late 1920s (Moriguchi 2003, p. 644), and the un-
employment insurance bill was not passed during the interwar period (Kase 2006). The
turnover rate of small and medium enterprises was approximately 30%, and the average
annual turnover rate of factory workers between 1918 and 1939 was 28.3% (Hyodo 1971;
Taira 1970). Therefore, labor mobility remained at high levels across the country (Odaka
1999). With the exception of a small number of favored workers among the large compa-
nies, worker uncertainty in the labor market was high in interwar Japan, at which time a
comprehensive social security system had not yet been established.6
In spite of this uncertainty, it is known that the standard of living of the factory
workers was established around 1920 and was maintained through the interwar period,
while poor households were forced to experience fluctuations in their standard of living
(Nakagawa 1985). Even inequality among members of the working class—measured in
terms of the Gini coefficient—had decreased between the early 1920s and the early 1930s,
while the disparity in wealth among poor household had increased (Yazawa 2004; Bassino
2006). As a result, throughout the interwar period, the household saving rate and the
6In general, the introduction of government social insurance systems led to reduction in the use of
private insurance, such as private insurance purchase and precautionary savings (Kantor and Fishback
1996; Emery 2010). In terms of official social welfare assistance, however, comprehensive public assistance
did not exist in prewar Japan (Ogasawara and Kobayashi 2015). In interwar London, pension payments
constituted an income below the poverty line (Baines and Johnson 1999). This underscores the importance
of risk-sharing institutions, as studied by Scott and Walker (2012) and as described in the introduction.
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average years of education increased, whereas the fertility rate declined (Mosk 1979; Godo
2011; Minami 2002). This “odd” trend implies that working-class households had coped
with multiple risks relatively well, and had therefore contributed to the accumulation of
human or physical capital; that capital became a driving force of economic growth in
postwar Japan (World Bank 1993; Mason 1997; Bloom and Williamson 1998).
By leveraging the detailed information available on working-class households—as cap-
tured through surveys conducted after World War I—the current study investigates the
risk-coping behaviors of factory worker households in Osaka city. It does so by under-
taking a two-step process. In the first step, I test the “full insurance hypothesis.” If
idiosyncratic shocks are well insured by not only financial markets but also communities
or governmental assistance, households can smooth their consumption. An important
strategy in coping with idiosyncratic shocks is, therefore, the insurance contracts offered
in market and nonmarket mechanisms (Fafchamps 2003; Dercon 2004). Since full risk-
sharing among consumers suggests that a representative agent model can describe the
real economy, testing consumption insurance has been explored in the consumption lit-
erature. Although many previous studies reject the hypothesis of full risk-sharing and
found that individual consumption is affected by idiosyncratic shocks, they reveal that
the risk is pooled to a considerable degree, or that the risk insurance hypothesis was not
rejected for certain expenditure categories.7 While considering this overall background,
the current study investigates whether the full risk-sharing hypothesis is accepted, the
extent to which it holds, and what categories of consumption are robust to shocks.
In the second step, I investigate the efficiency of risk-sharing. Although in a complete
market the risk-coping strategy typology is no longer important, in an imperfect market,
the choice of insurance instruments depends on the market imperfections at hand. How-
ever, the typical test of full risk-sharing, as explained above, provides little information as
to how risks are shared. Regarding the choice of risk-coping instruments, self-insurance is
the primary way in which households deal with risk (Carroll 1997). Microfinancial lend-
ing institutions and informal gifts are also important means of dealing with uncertainty
(Islam and Maitra 2012). In the current study, I separately analyze associations between
7Examples of studies investigating full risk-sharing include those of Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991),
Deaton (1992), Townsend (1994), Hayashi et al. (1996), and Kohara et al. (2002).
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idiosyncratic income shocks and either net borrowing or other income sources, including
gifts and changes in assets.
3 Theoretical framework
If risk is shared efficiently in an economy, individual consumption should be unaffected by
idiosyncratic variations in income. As a first step, I test the hypothesis of full risk-sharing
to analyze whether risk had been shared efficiently, and what categories of consumption
were robust to shocks at that time. To derive the empirical specifications needed to
test the hypothesis, I reviewed the necessity of full risk-sharing for any interior Pareto-
efficient allocation in a simple closed-exchange economy lacking storage, in the spirit of
Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991). Mace (1991) found that if in the case of a constant
absolute risk aversion preference, individual i ’s consumption cit can be written as:
cit = c
a
t +
1
σ
(logωi − ωa) + (hit − hat ), (1)
where σ is the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion, ωi is individual i ’s welfare
weight, hit is preference shock, and c
a
t , ω
a, and hat are aggregate variables of consumption,
the planner’s weight, and preference shock, respectively (see Appendix A for details of
the derivation). This equation implies that individual-level consumption should vary
positively with aggregate consumption, while individual-level income should have no effect
on individual consumption in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets.
The first difference of equation (1) will eliminate the individual fixed effect to yield:
cit − cit−1 = cat − cat−1 + hit − hit−1 − (hat − hat−1). (2)
This equation implies that changes in individual-level consumption should depend only
on the aggregate consumption variable, and not on any idiosyncratic shock variables.
Thus, using the change in individual income yit − yit−1 as a proxy for idiosyncratic shock,
7
I characterize the empirical specification as:
cit − cit−1 = α1(cat − cat−1) + α2(yit − yit−1) + it, (3)
where it is a disturbance term that includes both the time-varying preference shock, which
affects individual-level consumption, and measurement errors in the data. Similarly, I can
also express equation (3) under the case of a constant relative risk aversion preference:
log cit − log cit−1 = α1(log cat − log cat−1) + α2(log yit − log yit−1) + it. (4)
For both equations, if risk is efficiently shared among individuals, the coefficient on the
change in individual-level income or the growth rate of individual-level income becomes
0, while the coefficient on the change in aggregate consumption or the growth rate of
aggregate consumption becomes 1. Hence, the null hypothesis of full risk-sharing is α1 = 1
and α2 = 0. Furthermore, one can surmise that estimates of α2 possibly range from 0
(for full insurance, where idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly insured) to 1 (for the total
absence of insurance, in the case of the growth specification). To investigate the degree
of insurance, therefore, I use the growth specification of equation (4) to test the full
risk-sharing hypothesis.
With the second specification, I intend to investigate risk-coping mechanisms. Follow-
ing Fafchamps and Lund (2003), I consider that household consumption can be defined
as follows:
cit = y
Pi + yT it + b
i
t + w
i
t, (5)
where bit and w
i
t indicate net borrowing from lending institutions, and net income from
other temporary sources (including profits from gifts and the sale of assets).8 yPi and
yT it are permanent income and transitory income, respectively. Equation (1) can then be
rewritten by substituting equation (5):
bit + w
i
t = −(yPi + yT it ) + cat +
1
σ
(logωi − ωa) + (hit − hat ). (6)
8Although Fafchamps and Lund (2003) consider net gifts and changes in household assets separately,
I aggregate these sources, given the limited availability of historical data (Section 4).
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The time-constant components (yPi, ωi) and individual-constant components (cat , h
a
t ) can
be replaced by the individual fixed effect (νi) and the time fixed effect (λt), respectively.
The transitory income and preference shock (yT it , h
i
t) can be replaced by the idiosyncratic
income shock (y˜it) and the observed family characteristics (x
i
t), respectively. Under these
assumptions, the empirical specification is given as follows:
bit + w
i
t = κ+ δy˜
i
t + x
′i
tγ + νi + ζt + e
i
t, (7)
where eit is a random error term. If the idiosyncratic shocks are well compensated by bor-
rowings, gifts, and/or the sale of household assets, the estimated coefficient on the shock
variable should be negative and statistically significant. To assess which channels were
effectively used at that time, therefore, I regress the borrowing (bit) and other temporary
sources (wit) separately on the shock variable, in the spirit of Fafchamps and Lund (2003).
4 Data
After World War I, many household surveys were conducted by local governments in the
Japanese cities, to better understand the rapid formation among households of living styles
(Nakagawa 1985). Analyzing the data obtained from these surveys helps reveal household
management strategies in urban areas. To investigate household expenses in terms of
risk-coping strategies, I compiled a unique survey report of the Report of Labor Research
(RLR), which documents the monthly family budget of working-class households between
July 1919 and July 1920.9 In this survey, the Municipal Bureau of Labor Research of
Osaka investigated the monthly income and expenditures of the households of 411 wage-
earning and salaried workers within the Osaka city area. Although details in the sampling
method are, unfortunately, not recorded—as is the case with other historical household
survey datasets—the households had been selected through a labor union or directly at
the factories. Accordingly, approximately 83% of the household heads were artisans.
9In the current study, I use a reprinted edition of the original archives, as found in Tada (1991).
Although James and Suto (2011) used 99 households in the RLR as an annual-level cross-sectional
dataset, the current study is the first to use monthly data from this survey.
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In Appendix B.1, I confirm that relative to the occupation structure in Osaka city at
that time, all the occupations of the RLR households were biased towards manufacturing
industries. Therefore, the current study targets these factory worker households.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Level Log-difference
Observations Mean Std. dev. Observations Mean Std. dev.
Consumption 1880 88.72 38.54 1574 0.02 0.37
Food 1880 41.72 15.10 1574 0.01 0.33
Housing 1880 7.86 4.92 1574 0.02 0.50
Utilities 1880 3.76 2.85 1368 0.04 1.25
Furniture 1880 2.27 4.96 1136 0.02 1.91
Clothes 1880 10.74 15.56 1519 0.08 1.69
Education 1880 0.53 1.51 528 -0.05 1.17
Medical expenses 1880 3.79 4.46 1557 0.01 0.89
Entertainment expenses 1880 5.58 6.84 1473 0.03 1.31
Transportation 1880 1.14 1.90 1130 0.05 1.43
Other 1880 5.68 11.42 1538 0.02 1.32
Disposable income 1880 91.26 41.51 1574 0.02 0.44
Disposable income (except for b and w) (y˜)
Households receiving borrowings (b) 599 87.46 36.82 – – –
Households receiving other temporary income (w) 1711 92.48 41.84 – – –
Income from borrowing (b) 599 5.09 13.07 – – –
In borrowed months 154 19.78 16.88 – – –
Income from other income sources (w) 1711 10.62 22.92 – – –
In received months 1023 17.76 15.22 – – –
Family structure
Household size 237 4.00 1.61 – – –
Children aged 0–5 (%) 237 14.83 16.02 – – –
Children aged 6–9 (%) 237 7.40 11.26 – – –
Children aged 10–12 (%) 237 4.13 9.09 – – –
Children aged 13–16 (%) 237 5.43 10.38 – – –
Men aged 17+ (%) 237 33.52 14.02 – – –
Women aged 17+ (%) 237 34.69 15.72 – – –
Notes: The consumption and income figures listed in Column 1 are in Japanese yen. Disposable income is income
excluding tax payments. The group of children aged 0–5 (%) is used as the reference group in the regression.
I extracted those households whose heads worked in the factories during the initial
survey period.10 Correspondingly, 335 households remained of all 411 households. I
then excluded 18 households for which there was no information on monthly income
or family structure. An interesting characteristic of the RLR is that the investigatory
periods reached 13 months. Thus, the investigator visited households monthly to check
for data omissions and to collect survey books. While such a long-term panel survey
allows me to test the full insurance hypothesis, a set of households dropped out—and
10Although information on occupation had been subsequently revised if the household head changed
occupations, 11I focused on the households that were classified as being in the manufacturing industry
throughout the sampled period. I did so because the current study looks to analyze dynamic behavior in
the households of factory workers.
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were subsequently compensated for—during the study period. In fact, 78 households
were dropped because they had been observed for only one month during the survey
period. Finally, two households were dropped on account of having reported unrealistic
income and expenditure values (i.e., exceeding 600 yen per month). Accordingly, data
pertaining to 237 factory worker households were used in my empirical analyses.12
To provide an overview of the sample’s characteristics, I first describe the family struc-
ture features. The current study focuses on nonsingle households. While items pertaining
to income and expenditures had been recorded every month, information on family struc-
ture had been investigated in the initial survey month.13 Table 1 shows the summary
statistics of the data used. As for family structure, the average number of family mem-
bers was four, which approximates the figures reported in the 1920 population census
in Osaka city and those of a similar survey for factory worker households in Kyoto in
the 1920s (Appendix B.2). Almost all of the households include more than two persons,
excepting three single-person households. However, this does not mean that the distribu-
tion of household size was highly skewed; rather, it had good variation (Appendix B.2).
Second, the living standards in my sampled households could be classified as being in the
standard range of factory worker households at that time. While the average monthly
income for the RLR households was 92.9 yen, that of factory worker households in Kyoto
city between September 1926 and August 1927 was 96.6 yen (Bureau of Social Welfare
1930, p. 47).14 Overall, nonsingle urban working-class households employed in the man-
ufacturing industry are the primary interest of the current study.
I next discuss trends in household income and expenditures. Figure 1 illustrates
12I conducted a two-sample t-test with unequal variances between the full sample and subsample
of the RLR households. Differences in all household characteristics reported in Table 1—such as in-
come, consumption expenditures, and family structure among 411 households and the 237 factory worker
households—were not statistically significant at the 1% level (not reported). Although I focus on the
factory worker households, this finding implies that the RLR households have similar characteristics and
thus could be classified into a similar social class.
13To maintain the quality of the survey, the investigators visited all households and instructed them
all once or twice per month (Tada 1991, pp. 11–12). This means that my measure of consumption was
less likely to contain measurement error, and this in turn ensured the quality of the RLR survey would
be high. In addition, my aggregate measure of income and expenditures captured macroeconomic trends,
as shown in Figure 1 below.
14I used consumer price indices for 1919–1920 and 1926–1927 (Bank of Japan 1986, p. 436). The
household size in this survey is 3.9, suggesting household characteristics similar to those among RLR
households.
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Figure 1: Monthly income and expenditures
between June 1919 and June 1920
Note: Monthly income and expenditures are illustrated in Figure 1a. Net income, defined as
the difference between monthly income and monthly expenditures, is described in Figure 1b.
monthly income and expenditure information between June 1919 and June 1920. Excess
values and deficiencies (i.e., total monthly income minus expenditures) are also shown
in the figure, by month. First, overall, there were increasing trends in terms of both
income and expenditures. This is consistent with the increasing trend, worldwide, in
terms of living standards after World War I (Appendix B.3). However, one can see that
both income and expenditures seemed to decrease after April 1920. This trend reflects
the well-known recession that followed the war after March 1920 in Japan (Takeda 2002,
pp. 9–11). These macroeconomic trends will be effectively controlled for in my empirical
analyses.
Second, seasonality is clearly observed in December 1919 and January 1920. Both
income and expenditures steeply increased in December. Although differences between
income and expenditures were largely positive but fluctuated, this net income became
statistically significantly negative in January (Figure 1b). This was because, in order
to prepare for the New Year events and customs, both labor income and consumption
expenditures increased in December. Accordingly, workers took New Year’s holidays, and
this could have significantly reduced their earnings. Third, the difference between income
and expenditures also became large in March. This might relate to the fact that the fiscal
year ends in March and starts in April.
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Finally, Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in my quanti-
tative analysis. Ten categories of expenditures were used to test the full risk-sharing
hypothesis—namely, food, housing, utilities, furniture, clothes, education, medical ex-
penses, entertainment expenses, transportation, and other. As discussed in Section 3,
I use the first difference of the log of disposable income as a measure of idiosyncratic
income shocks. Both the mean of the first difference of the log of disposable income and
total consumption were positive in my RLR sample; this is consistent with the increasing
trends discussed above.15 For the second specification in testing risk-coping mechanisms,
I focused on the households that had income from borrowings and other sources. Income
from other sources included both informal gifts and asset sales, such as money drawn
from savings. This variable might include temporary earnings from family members other
than the spouse and children (e.g., grandmothers or grandfathers). Such aggregation of
income categories could disturb interpretations of the results. However, the average share
of earnings by nonworking-age family members was indeed reported to be substantially
small in the RLR sample. Unfortunately, the details of these additional sources of income
(i.e., who earned this income and when) had not been documented, and the average earn-
ings by these family members was reportedly 0.13 yen per diem, which was approximately
only 3.7% of the total daily per-capita income (Municipal Bureau of Labor Research of
Osaka 1921, p. 37). Therefore, one can consider the income from these sources as being
mainly from gifts and asset sales. This means that I could still separately test the use of
loans and/or other types of temporary income by using both variables.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Before formally testing the full risk-sharing in the regression framework, I first looked into
the relationship between changes in expenditures and income, in a descriptive manner.
Figure 2a and 2b show the log-difference of monthly disposable income and expenditures,
15Note that the mean of the growth rate of aggregate consumption was equal to that of the growth
rate of individual consumption.
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Figure 2: Log-difference of disposable income and expenditure
Notes: Distribution of the log-differences of disposable income and expenditures are shown in Figure 2a and 2b, respectively.
Disposable income is income excluding tax payments. The solid red lines in Figure 2a and 2b indicate the mean of the
log-difference of monthly disposable income and expenditures, respectively. Figure 2c describes the correlation between
the log-differences of monthly disposable income and expenditures.
respectively. The mean values of the log-difference of disposable income and expenditures
were approximately 0.018 and 0.022, respectively. While these values imply that both
disposable income and expenditures increased on average during the sample period, Fig-
ure 2a provides evidence that the households had still experienced negative income shocks.
Accordingly, the households frequently experienced the loss of expenditures, as reported
in Figure 2b. Changes in the log of disposable income indeed ranged from roughly -2.5
to 2.0 (Figure 2a), whereas changes in the log of expenditures ranged from roughly -1.5
to 1.5 (Figure 2b).
Figure 2c describes the relationship between the log-differences of monthly expendi-
tures and disposable income, which shows a positive linear relationship. To further delve
into this relationship, Figure 3 decomposes the total expenditures into 10 subcategories,
as described in Table 1. A quick review of these figures suggests that there were similar
positive relationships between changes in income and subcategories, except for housing
and education expenditures.16 This suggests that there might be a few subcategories that
had been less prone to being affected by income shocks. Based on these findings, in the
next subsection, I start to test for full risk-sharing.
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Figure 3: Relationship between changes in disposable income and expenditure
Notes: The relationship between changes in disposable income and expenditures for the subcategories in Table 2 is
described in the figures. For comparability, the minimum and maximum values of the y-axis were fixed at -7.0 and 7.0,
respectively.
Table 2: Results of testing for full risk-sharing
α1 α2 H0: α1 = 1, α2 = 0 Number of
Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error F -Stat. p-value observations
Panel A: June 1919 and June 1920
Total consumption 0.559 [0.067]*** 0.336 [0.041]*** 33.605 0.000 1574
Food 0.769 [0.084]*** 0.127 [0.041]*** 5.437 0.005 1574
Housing 0.142 [0.305] 0.000 [0.034] 4.151 0.017 1573
Utilities 0.743 [0.279]*** 0.117 [0.104] 0.746 0.475 1136
Furniture 0.751 [0.150]*** 0.470 [0.169]*** 3.903 0.022 1136
Clothes 1.106 [0.075]*** 0.283 [0.133]** 7.353 0.001 1519
Education 0.717 [0.087]*** 0.101 [0.129] 5.336 0.006 528
Medical expenses 0.703 [0.177]*** 0.199 [0.061]*** 7.111 0.001 1557
Entertainment expenses 0.954 [0.085]*** 0.362 [0.095]*** 7.366 0.001 1473
Transportation 0.994 [0.138]*** 0.268 [0.130]** 2.217 0.112 1130
Other 0.706 [0.182]*** 0.503 [0.131]*** 7.553 0.001 1538
Panel B: June 1919 and March 1920
Education 0.681 [0.096]*** 0.040 [0.142] 5.484 0.006 368
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard
errors are in brackets. Estimates for the intercepts are not reported, but are included.
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5.2 Full risk-sharing
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for equation (4). As described in Section 3, if
risk is efficiently shared, the coefficient on the growth rate of individual income becomes
0, while the coefficient on the growth rate of aggregate consumption becomes 1. This
means that the null hypothesis of full risk-sharing is α1 = 1 and α2 = 0. The F -statistic
p-values reported in Column 7 of Table 2 show that the full risk-sharing hypothesis was
rejected in most of the categories. For most of the rejected categories, idiosyncratic
income shocks had statistically significantly positive impacts on household consumption
growth. For instance, the estimated coefficient on the change in disposable income for
total consumption was 0.336. Note again that the estimate of α2 can range from 0 (for
perfect smoothing) to 1 (for the total absence of insurance). Thus, the estimate obtained
herein related to conditions far from perfect consumption smoothing. As discussed in
the introduction, an important advantage of my testing method is that it allows me to
compare my estimates to those obtained in previous studies. If I compare the estimates
with those in the 1990s Japanese economy (i.e., a near-complete market), as produced by
Kohara (2002), the estimate obtained here (0.336) was roughly six times larger. For food
expenditures, the estimated coefficient was 0.127, which is roughly 39 times greater than
that in 1990s Japan. This result implies that factory worker households in Osaka city at
that time could not effectively deal with idiosyncratic shocks. This finding is implicative,
because in the 1920s, Osaka was as urbanized an economy as Tokyo.17
However, for two categories (i.e., utilities and transportation), the null hypothesis was
not rejected at the 5% level. This result suggests that idiosyncratic shock was more likely
to take place among these consumption categories, given the fixed nature of those goods.
In addition, the estimated coefficient on the change in disposable income for housing
was very close to 0 and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the rent expenditure
was less likely to respond to idiosyncratic income shocks. In fact, expenditures for rent,
utilities, and transportation fees, especially for commutation, needed to be paid, regardless
16Appendix B.2 describes in finer detail the distribution of the subcategory expenditures.
17In fact, Osaka city was the second-largest city in Japan at that time. The population figures of Osaka
and Tokyo cities in 1920 were 1, 252, 983 and 2, 173, 201, respectively (Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet
1925, 1929b). These two cities therefore accounted for approximately 34% (3, 426, 184/10, 096, 758) of
Japan’s total urban population at the time (Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929a).
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of fluctuations. The distributions of these items, as reported in Appendix B.2, indeed
indicated smaller variances in these subcategories.
It is also noteworthy that education expenditures were less likely to respond to shocks.
The estimated coefficient on the change in disposable income for education was 0.101, and
therefore not statistically significantly different from 0. This implies that the educational
investment was relatively robust against idiosyncratic income shocks; thus, children in
working-class households might have been able to attend school, regardless of idiosyncratic
shocks. However, since Japan’s academic year starts in April and ends in March, some of
the children might have graduated from schools at the end of March 1920, which would
have disturbed education expenditures. To address this issue, I also ran a regression
while using an alternative cut-off period between June 1919 and March 1920, in Panel
B of Table 2. One can confirm that the result remains unchanged, and this suggests
that graduations did not disturb the results. This finding is also consistent with the raw
descriptive relationship reported in Figure 3f.
In using the testing specification used in this subsection, however, I assumed that the
aggregate measure of consumption (cat in Eq 4) can effectively capture macroeconomic
shocks. Moreover, Martin Ravallion and Shubham Chaudhuri (1997) examined how pa-
rameter estimates will be biased downwards if the first difference of the log of individual
income contains both idiosyncratic and aggregate income effects.18 Although it was dif-
ficult to remove idiosyncratic seasonalities, I further considered the two-way fixed-effect
model to separate aggregate risk from the idiosyncratic income effect (Appendix C.2). I
confirmed that the results would remain largely unchanged if I were to control for macroe-
conomic shocks by using month–year fixed effects rather than the aggregate measure of
consumption.
18See also Ligon (2008) for details on the problems surrounding private information and limited com-
mitment. The omitted variable bias—which is caused by ignoring the consumption of nontradable goods
or self-produced goods, in the case of international consumption risk-sharing and village economies—
has been signaled (Lewis 1996). However, the current study focused on purchased consumption, since
self-production was rare among working-class households in large cities at that time.
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Table 3: Comparison of the means of variables among subsamples
(2) Borrowings (3) Other sources
Household characteristics (1) Full sample Yes No Difference Yes No Difference
Average monthly disposable income (yen) 79.54 70.51 82.95 12.44‡ 79.71 78.56 -1.15
Size 4.00 4.22 3.92 -0.30 4.05 3.69 -0.37
Children aged 0–5 (%) 14.83 15.82 14.46 -1.37 15.00 13.88 -1.12
Children aged 6–9 (%) 7.40 10.16 6.35 -3.81† 7.41 7.29 -0.13
Children aged 10–12 (%) 4.13 4.56 3.97 -0.59 4.20 3.74 -0.45
Children aged 13–16 (%) 5.43 6.54 5.01 -1.53 5.42 5.48 0.06
Men aged 17+ (%) 33.52 30.10 34.81 4.71† 33.64 32.81 -0.83
Women aged 17+ (%) 34.69 32.81 35.40 2.59 34.33 36.79 2.46
Number of households 237 65 172 202 35
Notes: ‡ and † represent statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The average monthly disposable
income is the average of disposable income (excluding temporary income from borrowings and other sources). Data
on family structure were collected in the initial month of the survey.
5.3 Risk-coping strategies
The foregoing results suggest that housing, utilities, transportation, and education expen-
ditures were less likely to be affected by idiosyncratic shocks. One plausible explanation
for this result is intrahousehold resource allocation: households could allocate their re-
sources for these consumption categories to food, clothes, entertainment, and so on.19
However, another possibility was that this result implies that certain risk-coping mecha-
nisms could mitigate fluctuation in subcategories of household consumption, even though
the full risk-sharing hypothesis was rejected. Since the results of the above test of full
risk-sharing provided little information as to how risk was shared, I investigated whether
borrowings and/or other temporary sources of income serve to efficiently share risk among
households.
I first investigated the observable household characteristics among various groups with
respect to risk-coping strategies (Table 3). Column 1 indicates the means for all house-
holds, while Column 2 compares the means of households with borrowings to those of
other households. Column 3 compares the means between the households that received
temporary income (other than borrowings) and otherwise.
Column 2 implies that there was a statistically significant difference in average monthly
disposable income between the two groups. The monthly disposable income of households
with borrowings was approximately 12.4 yen lower than that of the other households.
19In addition to the resource allocation among categories, households could also alter their diet in order
to adjust food expenditures (O¨berg 2016).
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Figure 4: Average monthly net income and temporary income,
between June 1919 and June 1920
Notes: Average net income is defined as income minus expenditures. Figure 4a illustrates monthly net income
and borrowings for 65 households reported in Column 2 of Table 3. Figure 4b illustrates monthly net income and
temporary income (other than borrowings) for 202 households reported in Column 3 of Table 3.
Differences in family characteristics were relatively unclear, but among households with
borrowings, the share of those with children aged 6–9 was higher than that among other
households, by roughly 3.8 percentage points. Additionally, among households with bor-
rowings, the share of those with men aged 17+ was lower than that among other house-
holds, by 4.7 percentage points. This implies that the households with more school-aged
children and fewer adult men were more likely to rely on loans; this in turn suggests
that households with younger heads had to borrow money to take care of their children.
Although I could determine from the binary choice models no such clear relationship
between borrowing and family structure (Appendix C.2), I tried to include the family
structure variables in the following statistical analysis.20 In contrast, Column 3 shows
that there were no statistically significant differences between households that received
any other temporary sources of income and the other households. This may indicate that
the withdrawal of savings and receiving gifts were less likely to be influenced by credit
constraints.
Figure 4 then illustrates average monthly net income and temporary income between
June 1919 and June 1920. Figure 4a presents net income and borrowings, while Fig-
20In fact, the additional labor supply would also be an alternative means of coping with income shocks
(Horrell and Oxley 2000; Moehling 2001). The increased dependence on the household head’s earnings
due to urbanization could be associated with the increased demand for market purchases of insurance (di
Matteo and Emery 2002).
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Table 4: Results of testing risk-coping mechanisms
Borrowings Other sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Disposable income (y˜) -0.115** -0.122** -0.671** -0.516*** -0.192*** -0.198*** -0.418*** -0.457***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.262) (0.143) (0.040) (0.039) (0.100) (0.097)
Model Linear Linear Nonlinear Nonlinear Linear Linear Nonlinear Nonlinear
Household and month–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family structure × Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 599 599 599 599 1711 1711 1711 1711
Censored 445 445 445 445 688 688 688 688
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Results from the fixed-
effects Tobit model, as proposed by Honore´ (1992), are reported in Columns 3–4 and 7–8. A quadratic loss function
was applied for the estimation, to ensure computational tractability. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For
the linear models, standard errors are clustered at the household level.
ure 4b presents net income and temporary income from other sources. Figure 4a shows
a relatively clear negative correlation between net income and borrowings. The average
monthly income from borrowings was approximately 5 yen, as reported in Table 1. If I
were to exclude the household–month cells without borrowings, however, this value would
become 19.78 yen, accounting for approximately 28% of the average disposable income
(19.78/70.51; Table 3). This implies that borrowings might have constituted an important
risk-coping strategy in Japan’s working-class households at that time. In contrast, the
correlation illustrated in Figure 4b is unclear.21 The average monthly income from these
income sources was approximately 17.76 yen, thus accounting for approximately 22% of
the average disposable income (17.76/79.71; Table 3). Although the share was smaller
than that of the borrowings, it comprised one-fifth of total disposable income.
Finally, I looked at the results for the second specification of equation (7).22 Columns
1–4 present the results for borrowings, while Columns 5–8 present the results for the
other sources. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 also include interaction terms between the family
structure variables listed in Table 1 and quarter fixed effects.23 Columns 3–4 and 7–8
21Despite this ambiguity, I confirmed a weak negative correlation upon excluding the observation of
December 1919 in Figure 4b, which reflected clear seasonality. See Appendix C.3 for details of the result.
22 Note again that I limited the sample to the households that had received any income from borrowings
and/or other sources during the study period as reported in Table 3. As mentioned, although I found the
tendency for households with higher disposable income to be less likely to borrow money, correlations
between family structure and the choice of these additional income sources were statistically insignificant
(Appendix C.2).
23 I used the quarter fixed effects rather than month–year fixed effects, because optimization in the
nonlinear fixed-effect model is computationally demanding, especially when the models are complex.
Nonlinear specifications with month-year fixed effects are indeed no longer computationally practical. In
the linear models, however, I confirmed that the results would remain unchanged if I used the interaction
20
employ the fixed-effects Tobit model proposed by Honore´ (1992), to address the potential
attenuation effects induced by censoring.
In Column 1, the estimate is negative and statistically significant. This result remains
unchanged if I include the family structure variables in Column 2. This finding implies
that the composition of family members might be irrelevant in these matters. The absolute
value of the estimate is increased approximately six-fold (0.671/0.115) if I take data-
censoring into account in Column 3. This is indeed consistent with the fact that more
than 70% of the observations were censored, as reported in the final row of Table 4.
The estimate in Column 4 indicates that a 1-yen increase in disposable income reduced
temporary income from borrowings by 0.516 yen.
A similar relationship can be seen for the other income sources. The estimate is
statistically significantly negative and is also robust against including the family structure
variables (Column 6). The absolute value of the estimate is increased approximately two-
fold (0.418/0.198) after dealing with the censoring issues in Column 7.24 The estimate
in Column 8 implies that a 1-yen increase in disposable income reduced the temporary
income from the other sources by 0.457 yen. A relatively smaller magnitude than that for
borrowing is consistent with the raw descriptive relationship illustrated in Figure 4b.
These results suggest that the magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks on borrowing was
slightly greater than that on the other temporary income sources, such as gifts and savings
withdrawals. Despite the smaller amount, therefore, the borrowing might have functioned
well in response to income shocks at that time.25
6 Discussion
To analyze whether the risk had been shared efficiently and which categories of consump-
tion were robust to shocks at that time, I tested the hypothesis of full risk-sharing. The
of the month–year fixed effects (not reported).
24A smaller increment compared to the case of borrowings was found to be consistent with the lower
proportion of censored observations (i.e., 40% [688/1711]).
25I confirmed that the results would remain largely unchanged if I were to include the household-specific
time trend. See Appendix C.4 for the results. This may be because my sample period was relatively
short (i.e., 13 months), and also because the macroeconomic trend observed in Figure 1 was effectively
captured by the month–year fixed effects.
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results suggest that the housing, utilities, and transportation expenditures failed to re-
ject the null hypothesis. While these categories have a durable nature, I also found that
children’s education expenditures were robust to idiosyncratic shocks. This is consistent
with the fact that the average years of schooling increased throughout the early 20th cen-
tury, and accelerated Japan’s rapid economic growth in the postwar period (World Bank
1993). To analyze the mechanism of risk-sharing, I estimated the income elasticity of the
temporary income sources. I found that temporary income from borrowings and from
other sources (e.g., savings and gifts) were statistically significantly increased if house-
hold income were reduced on account of idiosyncratic shocks. The estimated magnitude
was larger on the borrowings than on the other temporary income sources. Although I
could not break down the latter income sources, this means that microfinancial lending
institutions, saving institutions, and informal gifts might have played important roles in
mitigating income shocks.
Considering these results, I next examined the kinds of lending institutions that had
been widely used among Japan’s working-class households at that time. Regarding loan
institutions, one can claim the importance of pawn shops (shichiya). Although pawn-
broking had been in decline in the early 20th century in Europe, pawn shops remained an
essential microloan institution throughout 20th-century Japan; see Shibuya et al. (1982),
Murhem (2015), and Kentta¨ (2016). Official report of pawn shops document the fact that
there were 983 pawn shops in Osaka city in October 1919; this represents a pawn shop
“density” of 1,660 citizens per shop. According to the report, artisans were the most
frequent users of the shops, accounting for 57.3% of all users.26 The average amount of
money borrowed by artisans per event was 10.6 yen (Osaka City Office 1920, pp. 122–23).
This figure accounts for approximately 53.6% (10.6/19.78) of the mean value of borrow-
ings among my RLR households (Table 1). If I use the median value of borrowings, this
figure reaches 71.3% (10.6/14.86). Thus, pawn shops clearly constituted a key microfi-
nancial lending institution in Japan at that time, and they were widely used by factory
workers. Indeed, the report of the Osaka City Office states that the pawn shop was a
“very major financial institution among the artisans” (Osaka City Office 1920, p. 153).
26In all, 15.1% are workers in commerce. In terms of average borrowing, 43.3% of the total amount
loaned by the shops had been borrowed by artisans (Osaka City Office 1920, p. 102, 104).
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Since inexpensive clothes were the dominant pawns at that time, the workers were able
to borrow money without risk of fall into heavy debt (Shibuya et al. 1982; Saito 1989).
The pawn shops had thus been an access-friendly loan institution for the working-class
households.
This historical fact suggests, furthermore, that it had been difficult to borrow money
from other lending institutions. One example of a lending institution other than a pawn
shop is a money-lending business (kinsen kashitsuke gyo¯). In 1926, there were 196 money-
lending institutions in Osaka city, and the per-event loan amount generally ranged from
20 to 200 yen—an amount considerably larger than that offered at pawn shops (Osaka
City 1934, pp. 240–41). These lending institutions including banks were less likely to be
used by the working-class households due to the costly collateral (Shibuya 2000; 2001).
Although the other potential example is the informal gifts, the gifts from their personal
networks had also been less likely to be used among working-class. A official survey in
Tokyo in 1933 indeed shows that approximately 70% of total borrowing in the working
households was from pawnshop, whereas that ratio from their relatives and friends was
only 21% (Inoue 2019).
In contrast with these formal and informal institutions, precautionary saving had been
an important alternative risk-coping strategy in urban working-class households in Japan
(James and Suto 2011). Postal saving (yu¯bin kyoku) and saving banks (chochiku ginko¯)
were saving institutions widely used around 1920.27 The number of postal saving accounts
in Osaka at the end of December 1920 was 1, 141, 405, accounting for 44% of Osaka’s total
population (Osaka Chamber of Commerce 1922, p. 6).28 The average savings per account
was 45.4 yen—an amount roughly equivalent to 49% (45/91) of the average monthly
disposable income of RLR households (Table 1). As for saving banks, there were 36
banks in Osaka city in 1921.29 In 1923, there were approximately 62 accounts per 100
Osaka citizens; this implies that more than one-half of the city’s citizens had an account
in a saving bank. The average savings set aside by households whose head was employed
27See Okazaki (2002) and Tanaka (2014) for historical overviews of these saving institutions.
28The number of people in Osaka prefecture as per the 1920 population census was 2, 587, 847 (Statistics
Bureau of the Cabinet 1928, p. 2).
29The description of saving banks is obtained from the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research (1925,
pp. 82–95).
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in manufacturing was reportedly 50 yen; again, this amount is roughly 55% (50/91) of the
average monthly disposable income of RLR households. These facts suggest that despite
having only small amounts of savings, factory workers were able to draw on their savings
in the event of economic hardship.
In summary, urban factory worker households in Osaka in the early 1920s might have
been able to maintain themselves in the face of financial hardship, in the sense that they
could cope with making payments for essential expenditures such as rent, utilities, and
commuting. I suggest that they were able to cope with idiosyncratic income shocks by
using microfinancial lending institutions, their precautionary savings, and presumably,
informal gifts, although gifts are fundamentally unobservable. My estimates suggest that
borrowing responds more sensitively than the other temporary income sources. Despite
these findings, the full risk-sharing hypothesis is rejected for overall expenditure. This
suggests that the households prioritized fixed payments—such as rent, utilities, and com-
mutation fees—when facing income shocks. Although they could not fully smooth their
consumption, they might have managed to live daily life by leveraging microfinancial and
saving institutions.
An important finding of the current study is that expenditures relating to children’s
education were also robust to idiosyncratic income shocks. Since education expenditures
include both school fees and the cost of textbooks and stationery, this result implies that
parents might have considered investments in their children’s education an important
expenditure. This speculation is consistent with Japan’s documented sustainable im-
provements in terms of average years of education, which helped accelerate Japan’s post-
war rapid economic growth (see the introduction). Therefore, the results herein suggest
that microfinancial lending institutions and saving institutions might have contributed to
Japan’s accumulation of human capital during its period of industrialization.
These findings help fill a gap in the current body of knowledge within the literature, as
described in Section 2; in so doing, they help explain why the living standards of Japanese
factory worker households remained relatively stable across the interwar period. Future
research should further investigate the details of intrahousehold resource allocation among
working-class households in times of economic hardship.
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Appendices
Appendix A Theory appendix
Let us assume that there are N individuals named i = 1, ..., N in the economy. Individual
i receives an uncertain income yit(st), where st ∈ St stands for the state of the world
at time t and derives instantaneous utility u(cit(st), h
i
t(st)) from consumption c
i
t(st). The
expected lifetime utility of individual i is expressed as
N∑
i=1
ωi
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st∈St
pi(st)u(c
i
t(st), h
i
t(st)), (8)
where ωi is the social planner’s weight, which is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of
each agent, and satisfies 0 < ωi < 1 (Negishi, 1960); 0 < β
t < 1 is the discount factor;
pi(st) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that state st takes place at time t ; and hit(st) is a preference
shock.
The social planner maximizes the objective function (8) by choosing an allocation of
consumption across individuals, subject to the aggregate resource constraint of the form:
N∑
i=1
cit(st) =
N∑
i=1
yit(st). (9)
By postulating a constant absolute risk aversion preference, u(cit(st), h
i
t(st)) = − 1σ exp(−σ(cit(st)−
hit(st))), where σ > 0 is the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion, I can obtain the
first-order condition for individual i :
ωiβtpi(st) exp(−σ(cit(st)− hit(st))) = λt, (10)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (9) at time t. Taking the
log of equation (10) and aggregating over agents, I obtain individual i ’s consumption as
follows:
cit(st) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
cit(st) +
1
σ
(
logωi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
logωi
)
+ hit(st)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
hit(st). (11)
For simplicity, I use the conventional notation for a random variable cit ≡ cit(st) and
1
hit ≡ hit(st). Finally, equation (11) with this notation becomes:
cit = c
a
t +
1
σ
(logωi − ωa) + (hit − hat ), (12)
where
cat =
1
N
N∑
i=1
cit, ω
a =
1
N
N∑
i=1
logωi, hat =
1
N
N∑
i=1
hit. (13)
Appendix B Data appendix
B.1 Household head’s occupation
To discuss the sampling feature of the RLR, I compare the share of occupation among
household heads within the RLR households to relevant statistics obtained from the na-
tional population census. Table B.1 shows the share of men’s occupation among all
households in Osaka prefecture or city in 1920, and that of RLR households in the first
month of the survey.30 Occupations were classified into nine social class categories, using
the industrial classification of the first population census, which was conducted in 1920
(Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929a, pp. I–IV).
Table B.1: Industrial structure in RLR households and population censuses
Name of survey (1) 1920 Population census (2) 1920 Population census (3) The RLR
Survey area Osaka prefecture Osaka city Osaka city
Survey subject Complete survey of the prefecture Complete survey of the city Sample from the city area
Survey month and year October 1920 October 1920 June 1919 to June 1920
Agriculture 14.1 0.8 0.0
Fisheries 0.5 0.1 0.0
Mining 0.3 0.3 0.0
Manufacturing 42.5 45.6 82.5
Commerce 25.8 34.0 2.0
Transport 8.7 10.6 4.2
Public service and professions 6.2 6.7 6.7
Housework 0.1 0.1 0.0
Other industry 1.8 1.8 4.4
Notes: Occupations were classified using the industrial classifications of the first population census, conducted in 1920.
Individuals whose occupation were classified as “unknown” were dropped. Sources: Calculated by the author from the
RLR dataset. Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929a, pp. 8–11; Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929b, pp. 84–85,
108–09.
Column 1 presents the share of occupation of those men who participated in the
30In the RLR dataset, information on the household head’s occupation can be obtained for 406 house-
holds (of all 411 households) in the first month of survey.
2
Table B.2: Household head’s occupation and monthly income
Monthly income (in yen)
Occupation Observations Median Std. dev.
Miscellaneous 185 72.18 39.20
Train crew 121 79.50 41.14
Artisan 2060 83.18 44.95
Commerce 29 127.60 203.86
Public official and teacher 55 141.45 50.07
Notes: “Miscellaneous” includes laborers, servants, and those en-
gaged in domestic piecework.
work force across all of Osaka prefecture. Although 14% of men worked in the agricul-
tural sector, most men worked in other industries. Since this figure for all of Japan was
45.8%, Osaka was a fairly well-industrialized prefecture at that time (Statistics Bureau
of the Cabinet 1929, pp. 8–11). In fact, as shown in Column 2, approximately 90% of
working men in Osaka city worked in the manufacturing, commerce, or transportation
industries. Bear in mind, again, that the shares of men who worked in the manufactur-
ing, commerce, and transportation industries across Japan were 22%, 12.8%, and 5.8%,
respectively (Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929a, pp. 8–11). Thus, these numbers
reflect the fact that Osaka was at that time a representative industrialized city, on par
with Tokyo city.
Column 3 in Table B.1 contains data on the prevalence of occupation among RLR
household heads, as a percentage share of all such households. Clearly, in terms of occu-
pation, the RLR household heads are concentrated in the manufacturing industry; 82.5%
of the men are artisans. To investigate the living standards of these households in the
manufacturing sector, Table B.2 lists the median monthly income of each occupation,
among the RLR households. The median monthly income of artisans was approximately
83.2 yen. The occupations with lower monthly income than artisans were train crew
members and workers in miscellaneous industries. While 17 heads were either train crew
members or a supervisor with Osaka City Trams, 34 heads were laborers or servants, or
engaged in domestic piecework. The median monthly income of these occupations was
approximately 79.5 and 72.2 yen, respectively. In addition, eight household heads within
the RLR worked in commerce. The median monthly income for commerce was higher than
3
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Figure B.1: Numbers of family members in RLR households
Note: This figure describes the distribution of the average number of family members among
RLR households.
that of artisans, albeit from a small number of observations. In terms of median monthly
income, public officials and teachers earned more than 140 yen per month. Therefore,
artisans in the factories in Osaka city at that time, as observed in the RLR dataset, could
be classified as being of the working class, but not as heading poor households.
B.2 Distribution of household size, income, and expenditure
As shown in Table 1, the average number of family members in RLR sample households
was four. According to the first population census, executed in 1920, the average house-
hold size in Osaka prefecture and city was 4.42 and 4.37, respectively (Statistics Bureau
of the Cabinet 1925, pp. 2–3). The figure for Osaka city is close to that in the RLR
sample. A similar survey of 231 factory worker households in Kyoto city, conducted in
1926, reports that the average household size was 3.9; this too is in the vicinity of the
value in my dataset (Bureau of Social Welfare 1930, pp. 46–47). These data findings
assure me that my data sample does not contain a set of outliers or otherwise unusual
household size values. In fact, Figure B.1 indicates that the distribution of the number
of family members has a reasonable shape and is not highly skewed.
Figure B.2a and B.2b show the monthly disposable income and expenditures of the
RLR households, respectively. The distribution of both figures is skewed rightwards,
thus showing the typical distribution of income and expenditures. The mean values of
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Figure B.2: Disposable income and expenditures (yen)
Notes: Monthly disposable income and expenditures are illustrated in the figures. Disposable income is income exclud-
ing tax payments. The solid red lines in Figure B.2a and B.2b indicate monthly disposable income and expenditures,
respectively. Figure B.2c illustrates the correlation between monthly disposable income and monthly expenditures.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of the log-difference of the subcategories
Notes: The distribution of the log-differences of monthly expenditures for the subcategories used in Table 2 is shown in
the figures.
disposable income and expenditures were 91.3 and 88.7 yen, respectively. Since a few
outliers have been excluded (as noted in the main text), there are no specific observations
here that take extremely large values. Figure B.3 presents the log-difference of monthly
expenditures for the subcategories. There is plenty of variation in the differences of ex-
penditures, except for housing (i.e., rent) and utilities expenditures. Figure B.4 describes
the distribution of monthly income from borrowing and from other sources (including
gifts and assets).
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Figure B.4: Income from borrowings and other sources,
including gifts and changes in assets (yen)
Notes: The distributions of monthly temporary income from borrowings and other sources are
illustrated in the figures.
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Note: The five-year moving average of per-capita personal consumption expenditures, in 1934–
1936 prices, is illustrated in the figure. Source: M. Shinohara (1967, pp. 140–41).
B.3 Per-capita personal consumption expenditure
Figure B.5 illustrates the five-year moving average of per-capita personal consumption
expenditures, in 1934–1936 prices and in yen, between 1912 and 1928. There was a clear,
increasing trend after World War I and until the end of 1920s. As noted in Section 3, the
recession after April 1920 and corresponding deflation took place in the early 1920s, and
the Great Kanto¯ Earthquake occurred in September 1923. Nonetheless, per-capita per-
sonal consumption expenditures increased during the early 1920s (Nakamura and Odaka
1989, pp. 36–37).
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Table C.1: Results of testing for full risk-sharing: two-way fixed-effect model
Disposable income
Coef. Std. error R-Squared Observations
Total consumption 0.358 [0.043]*** 0.4704 1574
Food 0.130 [0.043]*** 0.2921 1574
Housing 0.014 [0.037] 0.0883 1573
Utilities 0.195 [0.120] 0.0601 1136
Furniture 0.436 [0.201]** 0.1438 1136
Clothes 0.327 [0.148]** 0.2935 1519
Education -0.045 [0.161] 0.3082 528
Medical expenses 0.326 [0.088]*** 0.0790 1557
Entertainment expenses 0.501 [0.114]*** 0.1759 1473
Transportation 0.330 [0.175]* 0.1231 1130
Other 0.526 [0.155]*** 0.1214 1538
Notes: Household and month–year fixed effects are included in all specifica-
tions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets.
Appendix C Empirical analysis appendix
C.1 Results for the two-way fixed-effect model
The baseline specification for testing the full risk-sharing hypothesis in Subsection 5.2
assumed that the aggregate measure of consumption captures macroeconomic shocks. To
determine the sensitivity of this assumption, I use the two-way fixed-effect model instead
of the baseline first difference model. The specification is as follows:
log cit = θ log yit + µi + φt + uit, (14)
where cit is consumption, yit is disposable income, µi is a household fixed effect, φt is
a month–year fixed effect, and uit is a random error term. Table C.1 presents the re-
sults. The results are similar to those reported in Table 2. The estimated coefficients on
the changes in disposable income are statistically insignificant for housing, utilities, and
education, as seen in Table 2.
C.2 Differences in household characteristics
Table C.2 provides the results from the linear probability model. Note that the results
remained largely unchanged when I used nonlinear binary choice models, such as Probit
and logistic regression models. Column 1 contains the results for a specification that uses
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Table C.2: Results of testing risk-coping mechanisms
(1) Borrowing and the other sources (2) Borrowing (3) Other sources
Average monthly disposable income -0.001 -0.004*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 0.023 0.038 0.033*
(0.018) (0.029) (0.019)
Share aged 6–9 (%) -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Share aged 10–12 (%) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children aged 13–16 (%) 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Men aged 17+ (%) 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Women aged 17+ (%) -0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The number of
observations is 237. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a binary dependent variable that takes 1 for households that received any borrowings
or other temporary income. Column 2 contains the results for a specification that uses
a binary dependent variable that takes 1 for households that received any borrowings.
Column 3 contains the results for a specification that uses a binary dependent variable that
takes 1 for households that received any other temporary income (such as precautionary
savings and gifts). The family structure variables show no clear relationships with the
use of risk-coping strategies. An obvious result herein is that the estimated coefficient on
the average monthly disposable income is statistically significantly negative in Column
2. The estimate implies that a 1-yen increase in the average monthly disposable income
increases the probability of using any loan by 0.4%. Since the standard deviation of
the average monthly disposable income is 26.25 yen, this means that an increase of one
standard deviation in this variable increases the probability by approximately 11%.
C.3 Correlation between net income and temporary income
Figure C.1 presents the relationship between average monthly net income (i.e., income
minus expenditures) and the temporary incomes reported in Figure 4. Figure C.1a shows
the correlation between net income and temporary income from borrowings. Figure C.1b
shows the correlation between net income and temporary income excluding borrowings,
while Figure C.1c replicates Figure C.1b but excludes December 1919.
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Figure C.1: Relationship between average monthly net income and temporary incomes,
between June 1919 and June 1920
Notes: Figure C.1a describes the correlation between average monthly net income and temporary income from
borrowings. Figure C.1b describes the correlation between net income and temporary income excluding borrowings.
Figure C.1c replicates Figure C.1b but excludes December 1919 as an outlier (Section 4).
Table C.3: Risk-coping mechanisms: results from an alternative specification
Borrowings Others
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disposable income (y˜) -0.115** -0.120** -0.192*** -0.194***
(0.049) (0.060) (0.040) (0.049)
Household and month–year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household-specific time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 599 599 1711 1711
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets.
C.4 Results from alternative specification
Table C.3 presents the results from an alternative specification for testing risk-coping
strategies. Columns 1 and 3 show the baseline results reported in Table 4. Columns 2 and
4 add a household-specific linear time trend that is not used in the baseline specification
reported in Table 4. Clearly, my baseline results remain unchanged if I include the
household-specific trend. As discussed in the main text, the optimization in the fixed-effect
Tobit model is computationally demanding when the models are complex. Unfortunately,
estimating the specification that includes the household-specific trend is indeed no longer
computationally practical. The results should, however, remain largely unchanged if I
were to include the trend term, as censoring tends to induce attenuation effects.
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